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Abstract—Affective Computing is a rapidly growing field spurred by advancements in artificial intelligence, but often, held back by the
inability to translate psychological theories of emotion into tractable computational models. To address this, we propose a probabilistic
programming approach to affective computing, which models psychological-grounded theories as generative models of emotion, and
implements them as stochastic, executable computer programs. We first review probabilistic approaches that integrate reasoning about
emotions with reasoning about other latent mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires) in context. Recently-developed probabilistic
programming languages offer several key desidarata over previous approaches, such as: (i) flexibility in representing emotions and
emotional processes; (ii) modularity and compositionality; (iii) integration with deep learning libraries that facilitate efficient inference
and learning from large, naturalistic data; and (iv) ease of adoption. Furthermore, using a probabilistic programming framework allows
a standardized platform for theory-building and experimentation: Competing theories (e.g., of appraisal or other emotional processes)
can be easily compared via modular substitution of code followed by model comparison. To jumpstart adoption, we illustrate our points
with executable code that researchers can easily modify for their own models. We end with a discussion of applications and future
directions of the probabilistic programming approach
Index Terms—Affective Computing, Artificial Intelligence, Emotion Theory, Modeling Human Emotion
F
1 INTRODUCTION
ACHIEVING a human-like understanding of emotionsis a holy grail of affective computing. The ideal af-
fective computer has to correctly identity a user’s emotion
based on behavioral cues and contextual information, rea-
son about how its actions may affect the user’s emotions,
and choose its responses accordingly. Affective agents de-
ployed in a variety of applications, such as in tutoring [1],
social robotics [2], or other human-computer interactions [3],
are aiming to achieve this next frontier of emotional un-
derstanding. Research in recent years has made important
strides towards this goal, producing hundreds of papers
on applying machine learning techniques to recognizing
emotions (see [4], [5], [6], [7] for reviews). The success of
these efforts is due in large part to recent developments
in deep learning algorithms and computational power [8],
coupled with the availability of larger datasets [9]. However,
though these machine learning models may demonstrate
excellent performance at emotion recognition, they never-
theless fall short of being able to do true reasoning [10].
They are unable to carry out counterfactual and hypothetical
reasoning, provide causal attributions and explanations, or
incorporate contextual knowledge into their inferences. And
they usually do not generalize well outside the dataset they
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are trained on. By merely performing pattern recognition,
these machine learning models achieve perception, but fall
short of cognition about affect.
In contrast to the data-driven, machine learning ap-
proach, an alternative approach with a much older history
in affective computing favors constructing theory-based
models, such as emotion architectures (see [11], [12] for
reviews). These models are inspired by psychological the-
ories of emotion (e.g., [13], [14]), and focus in detail on
modeling the components and the computations that go
into emotional processes. For example, many such models
focus on computationally defining the cognitive evaluations
of experienced situations—appraisals—that give rise to emo-
tions [15], [16], [17]. Other models also focus on modelling
how emotions influence cognition and subsequent behavior
[18], [19]. However, these models tend to be hand-tuned
to specific theories and specific contexts—for example, the
model in [17] contains many rule-based appraisals that give
rise to emotions, but is not able to learn new appraisals or
modify existing appraisal rules for new contexts—and thus
they are unable to scale well to the complexity of larger,
naturalistic datasets. Another limitation is that these models
usually do not specify how one goes from naturalistic data,
such as a pixel-level representation of a smiling face, to a
representation of emotion: The exact “transformation” from
an emotion to a visually-observable muscular configuration
may be scientifically uninteresting (except perhaps for the
fact that such a reliable and valid mapping does or does not
exist), yet still important to an engineer wishing to build
applications that are sensitive to affect.
These theory-driven models differ not only in their the-
oretical assumptions and content, but also in the details of
their implementation, such that it is problematic to compare
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theories side-by-side [11], [12]. To add to this difficulty,
theory-driven approaches tend to have large barriers to
adoption, as most of them use specific architectures or sys-
tems that may be difficult for other researchers to adopt. For
example, the EMA model [16] and Marinier and colleagues’
[16] model are built on top of SOAR [20], and a researcher
who wishes to contribute to these lines of work will have to
learn an unfamiliar set of syntax and conventions—although
some have advocated for the field settling on a unified
architecture [21]. Other research groups may implement
their models in custom-built systems [18], [22], which may
not be easily available for other researchers to build upon.
By contrast, deep learning and other machine learning
approaches have experienced a meteoric rise in popularity
and adoption over the past few years. This is due in large
part to readily-available, open-source, deep learning tools
written in beginner-friendly programming languages like
Python and R, along with accessible learning materials
(tutorials, online courses) and a large and active community
(on programming forums and blogs like Stack Overflow and
Medium respectively). An ideal approach is one that “de-
mocratizes” affective computing by being easier to adopt,
which will increase the speed of research as well as infras-
tructural developments, while still maintaining the scientific
rigor and experimentation of theory-based approaches.
In this paper, we propose a probabilistic programming
approach to affective computing that marries the strengths
of theory-driven approaches with that of data-driven ap-
proach. Probabilistic programming is a modelling paradigm
by which one can specify theories of emotion using proba-
bilistic, generative models [23], [24]. We can explicitly rep-
resent uncertainty in emotion theory, randomness in emo-
tional phenomena, or even incomplete knowledge about an
agent’s mental state, as programs that contain some degree
of randomness. Because probabilistic programs are modular
and can be composed to form more complex programs,
we can focus on modeling at different levels of abstraction
[12], [21]. Having a hierarchy of abstract representations
also allows probabilistic programs to learn context-specific
knowledge (i.e., to the specific example) as well as knowl-
edge that can generalize to other scenarios [25]. One can
use a probabilistic programming framework to test different
emotion theories (e.g., of appraisal) by substituting modular
chunks of code and testing which theories best fit experi-
mental data. Modularity also allows integration of emotion
with other high-level theories of psychological phenomena,
such as mental states and motivation [10], [26].
In probabilistic programming, model specification is or-
thogonal to learning and inference in these models. This
separation allows the affective computing modeler to focus
on specifying the model rather than on inference and op-
timization methods, much like how so-called “high-level”
programming languages abstract away the workings of
machine code from the programmer. Such abstraction low-
ers the barrier to adoption by making languages easier to
learn, while simultaneously making them more efficient1.
Because inference in probabilistic programming is orthog-
onal to model specification, infrastructural development
1. For example, object-oriented programming was a major abstraction
that allowed complex data structures (objects) with their own functions.
of inference algorithms can proceed in parallel [27]. In-
deed, many modern probabilistic programming languages
leverage existing deep learning, optimization, and inference
libraries, which allows efficient and scalable learning from
large datasets [28]. The modeller can simply specify the
model, give it data, and press “run”, so to speak, relying on
general-purpose inference implemented within the proba-
bilistic programming language. Our claim is that probabilis-
tic programming combines the strengths of the data-driven
and theory-driven approaches in affective computing: It
allows the building of psychologically-grounded models,
hypothesis testing and scientific experimentation, within
an infrastructure to learn efficiently from and do inference
over large data. And it provides a common platform with a
low barrier to entry that will encourage integration among
existing approaches in the field.
We begin the paper by introducing the intuitive theory ap-
proach to understanding reasoning about emotion, and how
this approach has been formalized in the computational
cognitive science literature using probabilistic methods—
specifically probabilistic graphical models. Next, we intro-
duce probabilistic programming by discussing two recent
high-impact examples of applying probabilistic program-
ming to model human cognition. With this background, we
then discuss implementing a computational model of emo-
tion using probabilistic programming, by providing worked
example code in a re-analysis of a small multimodal dataset
[29]. We illustrate how one can model components such
as appraisal and emotion recognition from faces. We also
demonstrate reasoning capabilities that this probabilistic
programming approach has over previous approaches: for
example, it can generate novel emotional faces given a new
situation. Finally, we end by discussing the boundaries of
this approach, as well as the long-term promise of this
approach, such as to modelling emotion generation and
understanding complex intentional emotional displays.
2 IMPLEMENTING INTUITIVE THEORIES AS
PROBABILISTIC MODELS
People have an intuitive understanding of the world around
them. The average person may not be able to write down
Newton’s laws, but, upon witnessing a thrown baseball, is
able to intuitively predict the ball’s trajectory and where
it would land [30], [31]. This intuitive understanding also
extends to making sense of other people. If we see a room-
mate walk out of their room, pause, and turn back, we
intuitively start generating possible hypotheses about their
behavior—perhaps they forgot something in their room and
went back to retrieve it—even though these inferences are
made on sparse and incomplete information. In daily life,
we effortlessly make such inferences about other people’s
thoughts, feelings, and even personality and other traits
[32], [33], [34]. Such “intuitive physics” and “intuitive psy-
chology” are made possible by intuitive theories that consist
of a structured ontology of concepts—gravity, air resistance,
and velocity; goals, personality, and behavior—and the causal
relationships between these concepts [35], [36]. This knowl-
edge allows us to make predictions, complex inferences, and
offer explanations about the observed world. If we know
that Bob wants to eat (goal), we can predict that he will go
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look for food (behavior). Conversely, if we see that Bob has
gone to the cupboard and returns with some potato chips,
we can also infer that he knew that there were snacks in
the cupboard (Bob’s beliefs about the world), and perhaps
that he likes potato chips (preferences) [37]. Much like how
scientific theories allow scientists to produce a coherent
description of natural phenomena, these intuitive theories
allow humans to reason about and explain both the physical
and the social world that they live in [36], [38].
In recent work, we [10], [29] and others [26], [39] have
proposed that people also possess a structured intuitive the-
ory of emotions. This intuitive theory comprises conceptual
knowledge such as: what are emotions, moods and other af-
fective states; what types of event outcomes cause emotions;
what mental states influence emotions; and what types of
behavior emotions influence. Importantly, this conceptual
knowledge goes beyond encoding simple pairwise emotion-
behavior contingencies, such as recognizing emotional fa-
cial expressions, which many machine learning models are
already adept at [7]. It allows reasoning about emotions in
more complicated situations, such as with novel events or in
a new (e.g. cultural) context, and enables explanation gener-
ation, counterfactual reasoning, and hypothetical reasoning
[10]. Laypeople use their rich intuitive theories effortlessly
in daily life—the challenge for researchers is to distill this
implicit knowledge into workable computational models.
We note that there are important differences between
scientific theories of emotion (e.g. [17], [40]) and the intuitive
theories that laypeople employ. For one, the lay description
of emotion is far more coarse-grained. Intuitive theories do
not care about the neural bases of emotion [41], nor are
they concerned with a taxonomy of how many emotions
there are, or whether there is a hierarchy between “basic”
and other emotions [42], [43]. In fact, these intuitive theo-
ries differ remarkably across cultures—the antecedents and
consequents of emotions like shame vary by culture [44],
[45]—as well as across individuals [46], based on mood
[47] or mental illness [48]. In other words, while scientific
theories seek an “objective” truth, lay theories describe the
subjective reality that people live in. Thus, it is critical to
model intuitive theories because they are what laypeople
use to make sense of others’ emotions.
The intuitive theory approach lends itself well to compu-
tational modeling, especially probabilistic graphical mod-
eling. A probabilistic graphical model represents random
variables as well as the probabilistic interdependencies be-
tween these variables [49]. For example, a widely supported
intuitive theory of human behavior holds that (people think
that other) people have beliefs about the state of the world,
have desires (i.e., goals that they want to achieve), and
subsequently form intentions to act upon their beliefs to
maximize their desires [50], [51]. This belief-desire psychol-
ogy, or belief-desire-intention psychology, can be formalized
as a rational agent acting to maximize its utility given
its incomplete knowledge about the world, such as using
decision networks or partially-observable Markov decision
processes [52], [53], [54]. Inferring beliefs and desires from
actions reduces to Bayesian inference over this generative
model [37]. These recent “Bayesian Theory of Mind” models
have been successful at predicting participants’ judgments
of agents’ beliefs and desires, suggesting that they capture
how people reason about goal-directed behavior.
We can also add emotions into these generative models
of behavior. People know that others’ emotions arise as a
reaction to a motivationally salient event in the world, based
upon their beliefs and desires about the world [55], [56].
Many scientific theories of emotion propose that people
implicitly evaluate (“appraise”) experienced events along a
number of self-relevant dimensions based upon their mental
state, and feel emotions as a consequence of this appraisal
[14], [17], [40]. For example, a goal-conducive event like
winning a prize would produce happiness, while its un-
expectedness could also give rise to surprise. Recent work
has also suggested that laypeople perform a similar, “third-
person appraisal” process to reason about the emotions
of others [29], [39], [56], [57], [58], [59]. When reasoning
about someone else’s emotions, people implicitly adopt that
individual’s perspective and appraise the situation on behalf
of that individual. This capability develops very early in
life: even infants and young children are able to reason
about the emotional expressions that accompany fulfilled
or thwarted goals [60], [61] or mismatched expectations
[62], [63]. Thus, a simple intuitive theory of emotions might
have event outcomes and mental states jointly “causing”
emotions via an appraisal process, which in turn “cause”
facial expressions and other behavior [26], [29], [39], [57].
Several recent studies modeled such intuitive reasoning
about emotions using probabilistic graphical models (Fig.
1). We [29] investigated the third-person appraisal process
as people evaluated the emotions of others playing gambles.
We also had participants reason about emotions given both
the gamble outcome and another behavioral cue (e.g., facial
expression or verbal utterance). Such complex inferences
from multiple cues—cue integration—can be mathematically
derived using Bayesian inference [64], and the predictions
from a Bayesian model track laypeople’s judgments in these
complex scenarios. De Melo and colleagues [57] studied
laypeople’s inferences of appraisals from emotional ex-
pressions by modeling the generative processes from out-
comes to appraisals, emotions, and expressions. Given an
emotional expression, one can compute an estimate of the
latent appraisals by doing reverse inference in the model,
a process they term “reverse appraisal”. Indeed, they find
that laypeople’s subsequent behavior towards the agent
are mediated by their inferred appraisals of the agent’s
emotions. Wu and colleagues [39] similarly proposed a
model of how mental states—beliefs and desires—give rise
to actions and emotions; They model inference of mental
states from emotional expressions via Bayesian inference,
and show that these also track participants’ judgments.
Although these independently-conducted studies contain
differences in the details of their models (Fig. 1), there
was surprising agreement in the broader approach of using
Bayesian inference on a generative model of emotion, and
even in the general causal flow of the model. For example,
each study highlighted the importance of the third-person
appraisal process as an antecedent to emotion (for a more
in-depth discussion, we invite readers to see [10]).
From a computational cognitive science standpoint, in-
ference in these probabilistic models of emotions track
laypeople’s judgments, showing that such models provide
a good computational account of laypeople’s psychology,
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Fig. 1. Summary of previous work using probabilistic graphical ap-
proaches to model lay human reasoning about emotions. Figures are
adapted from (a) [29], (b) [57], (c) [39]. Shaded nodes represent ob-
servable variables, while unshaded nodes represent latent variables.
Variables that were “implicitly” modelled (i.e., not directly specified) are
rendered using translucent nodes. In (d), adapted from [10] and [26], we
illustrate the more general model that encompasses the models in (a-c).
yielding valuable scientific insight. From an affective com-
puting standpoint, such approaches afford strong, theory-
grounded models upon which to build applications that
reason like laypeople, and that laypeople reason about. For
example, if the goal is to build an expressive virtual char-
acter [65] or affective tutor [1] that interacts with laypeople,
then perhaps an intuitive theory-based model may provide
a way to generate more human-like affective behavior.
Implementing intuitive theories as probabilistic graph-
ical models has its limitations. In our opinion, the most
significant limitation is representation. Variables like emotion
are often represented using a single real-valued number, or
a vector along a number of emotion dimensions (see also
[66]). These representations cannot easily encode complex
information like the relational and temporal nature of emo-
tions: John is not just angry, 6 out of 7, he is often angry at
something or someone; This anger may be fleeting, or may
give rise to a life-long resentment. Such information is cru-
cial for proper reasoning about what behavior John might
next exhibit or how one might intervene to help regulate
John’s emotions, but is difficult to represent using graph-
ical models. Other representational challenges arise when
considering other affective phenomena, such as moods and
appraisal. Consider appraisal: Within a constrained scenario
such as playing a gamble or a social dilemma game with an-
other agent, the appraisal process may reduce to some linear
combination of real-valued features that define the outcome
of the game. More generally, however, the appraisal process
is a complex evaluative process that is difficult to represent
with current graphical approaches. Finally, learning prob-
abilistic graphical models from data and doing inference
in large models is computationally intensive, limiting their
real-world applications on larger, naturalistic datasets. We
propose that a modern “successor” of probabilistic graphical
modeling—probabilistic programming—may offer a solu-
tion to these limitations.
3 IMPLEMENTING INTUITIVE THEORIES USING
PROBABILISTIC PROGRAMMING
Probabilistic programming is a relatively new and powerful
modeling paradigm that offers much promise for affective
computing. Like probabilistic graphical modeling, proba-
bilistic programming allows one to capture abstract, concep-
tual knowledge (e.g., in human intuitive theories) as gener-
ative models. Instead of a graphical representation, prob-
abilistic programming represents conceptual knowledge as
stochastic programs—chunks of code that embed random-
ness into their execution [24], [67]. We start by introducing
two recent examples of probabilistic programming applied
to model human cognition (Fig. 2), before discussing its
features and its application to affective computing.
In a recent landmark study, Lake, Salakhutdinov,
and Tenenbaum [68] introduced a handwriting-recognition
model that successfully learns character concepts. After be-
ing shown just one example of a novel, handwritten charac-
ter, the model was able to correctly identify more examples
at a level comparable to humans (one-shot classification);
and when made to generate new exemplars of a novel
character, produced examples that were indistinguishable
from those produced by human volunteers (human-like
generative capacity). Underlying these impressive capabil-
ities is a powerful idea: a probabilistic generative model
that models the actual writing process. The model has, as
primitives, handwritten strokes such as straight lines or
curves. These strokes are composed to form more complex
parts that in turn are composed to make characters, subject
to constraints on where and how different strokes may be
joined together to form different parts or characters. Finally,
the model allows for motor variance at different steps in
the handwriting process, such as in choosing the start point
of each stroke, trajectory of each stroke, and how different
strokes are joined together. Such variance in the generation
process introduces “noise” into the visual appearance of the
character, but do not change the underlying concept that is
to be conveyed—a badly-written “g” is still a “g”, despite its
potential visual similarity to “q” (Fig. 2a). When presented
with novel characters, the model infers the steps needed to
generate the input characters: it inductively learns a program
for producing the character. This allows it to learn abstract
conceptual knowledge from visual features, and to flexibly
apply this knowledge in a more human-like manner [69].
Probabilistic programming can also be applied to so-
cial reasoning, such as language understanding [71]. In
conversation, people naturally assume, by convention, that
others are being informative when speaking, and this allows
people to make pragmatic inferences over what was not
explicitly said [72]. A statement like “Some of the students
passed the exam” invites the interpretation “Not all of
the students passed the exam”, even though the semantics
of the latter statement is stricter than and not necessarily
implied by the former [73]. We and our colleagues have
formalized this reasoning in terms of a Rational Speech Act
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Fig. 2. Simplified illustration of probabilistic programming applied to
human cognition, with pseudocode. (a) Our adaptation of the key ideas
in [68]. Characters (e.g., “g” and “q”) are composed of a sequence of
parts and subparts and their spatial relations (i.e., where the parts are
joined). There is motor variance in the “writing” process, which may lead
to visually similar, but conceptually different, character concepts. (b)
Language understanding in the Rational Speech Acts framework [70]
proceeds via nested reasoning: the pragmatic listener reasons about a
nested speaker, which in turn reasons about a nested literal listener.
(RSA) framework for language understanding [70]. First, we
define the literal listener (Lit) as a probabilistic program that
maps a heard utterance to its possible literal meanings (e.g.,
“some” denotes a non-zero quantity, which could be one, or
two, etc.). Next, the speaker (S) is a probabilistic program
that models a cooperative human communicator: It aims
to achieve the goal of Lit correctly inferring the state of the
world, and chooses an utterance to achieve that goal. Finally,
the pragmatic listener (L) hears an utterance and reasons
about the goals of the speaker S who produced it. Thus,
we implement the pragmatic listener L as a probabilistic
program that has within it a nested program S, which has
in turn another nested program Lit (Fig. 2b). This allows
nested social reasoning: the listener reasoning about the
speaker reasoning about the listener. For example, upon
hearing “Some of the students passed the exam”, L reasons
that, if it were indeed the case that “all the students passed
the exam”, then S would have said so; since S could have
but did not, it is more likely that “Some, but not all of the
students” achieved a passing grade. Note that S and Lit are
not actual agents, but they exist within listener L’s intuitive
theory of communication, which makes assumptions that
speakers choose their behavior rationally and following
Gricean maxims. The RSA framework has been applied to
model understanding of generic language [74]; nonliteral
language like hyperbole [75]; humor in wordplay [76]; and
politeness in indirect speech [77]. More generally, using
probabilistic programs in a compositional—in this case,
nested—manner provides a computational framework for
modeling social reasoning.
The two examples above illustrate some of the features
of probabilistic programming as a modeling paradigm that
make it appealing to affective computing. The core idea
is representing theory—laypeople’s intuitive theories about
handwriting, communication, or emotions—in terms of prob-
abilistic programs. Unlike deterministic programs that al-
ways produce the same output when given the same input,
probabilistic programs instead produce samples from a dis-
tribution of possible outputs. This allows explicit modeling
of uncertainty, whether such uncertainty arises from (i) in-
complete knowledge about the world and others’ unobserv-
able mental states, (ii) incomplete theory, or (iii) inherent
randomness in the generative process. For example, Lake
and colleagues [68] introduce one form of uncertainty via
motor variance at various steps in the character generation
process, while in the RSA framework [70], the model explic-
itly represents uncertainty in semantic meaning and speaker
goals. Affective computing applications face many sources
of uncertainty. Third-person appraisal requires an uncertain
inference about others’ latent beliefs and desires (incomplete
knowledge). There are individual differences, such as in
personality or cultural background, in how people with the
same expectations and goals appraise the same outcomes,
and how they will behave after: Many of these individual
differences have not been explored by scientists (incomplete
theory). Finally, the same person facing the same situation in
the same context might not always behave in the same way
(inherent randomness). Explicitly modelling these sources
of uncertainty is important for learning from data and
generalizing to new agents and contexts.
A second crucial feature is modularity. In a probabilis-
tic programming paradigm, small, modular probabilistic
programs are composed together in a hierarchical and/or
sequential fashion to produce more complex phenomena—
or to capture reasoning about such phenomena. In the
handwriting recognition example, there is a hierarchy where
strokes compose to form sub-parts, parts, and characters,
while in the language understanding example, social rea-
soning proceeds via inference in nested programs. Mod-
ularity and compositionality are particularly important in
modeling emotions and the processes that give rise to and
arise from emotion [12], [21]. This is because modeling emo-
tion necessitates modeling a wide range of processes from
emotion elicitation (via appraisal) to the behavioral effects
of emotion. Modularity is essential for defining small, re-
usable processes, and compositionality allows one to struc-
ture complex reasoning over these processes. For example,
an agent experiencing a negative emotion (after appraisal)
may want to down-regulate their negative emotion. One
way that it can do that is to choose an action that will
likely result in positive appraisals; Thus, the agent has to
re-use its concept of appraisal to best select an action to
achieve its goals. In fact, this action selection is an example
of an inference that is handled naturally in a probabilistic
program. With a generative model of actions to outcomes
to appraisals to emotions, one can condition on a desired
emotion, infer desired appraisals and outcomes, and infer
the actions that one has to take to achieve the desired goal.
Probabilistic programming is also becoming easier to
implement. There has been a surge of development in prob-
abilistic programming infrastructure in the past decade, due
in part to a large funding initiative from DARPA [78]. There
now exists many probabilistic programming languages un-
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der active development, and many of these exist as modules
or libraries written in existing programming languages like
Python (e.g., Pyro [79] and Tensorflow Probability) and
Javascript (e.g., WebPPL [80]). These languages are Turing-
complete, and can represent any computable probability
distribution. Moreover, some of these language leverage
existing optimized deep-learning libraries: As its name sug-
gests, Google’s Tensorflow Probability is built on top of
Tensorflow, while Uber-developed Pyro is built on top of
PyTorch. This allows one to leverage efficient optimization
(e.g., gradient descent algorithms), approximate inference
techniques (e.g., MCMC, variational inference), as well as
hardware acceleration (e.g., GPU computation). Thus, these
modern probabilistic programming languages combine both
the modeling flexibility of a universal programming lan-
guage with the power of modern deep learning.
4 MODELING EMOTIONS USING PROBABILISTIC
PROGRAMS
At an abstract level, probabilistic programming is an ap-
proach to modeling: It is not bound to any particular
language or even a particular architecture, unlike work in
cognitive and emotion architectures [16], [19]. That said,
to illustrate our points more concretely and to jumpstart
the community’s adoption of a probabilistic programming
approach to affective computing, in this section we provide
accompanying code written in the open-source probabilistic
programming language Pyro, itself written in Python. A
repository for the code in this paper, accompanying doc-
umentation, and links to tutorials, are available at:
https://github.com/desmond-ong/pplAffComp
4.1 Description of Dataset
As an illustrative example throughout this section, we use a
previously-collected dataset [29] (Experiment 3; available at
github.com/desmond-ong/affCog). In this experiment,
participants were shown characters playing gambles for
money. On some trials, participants saw the outcome of
the gamble, or a facial expression ostensibly made by the
character after seeing the gamble, or both the outcome and
the facial expression. They then rated how the character
felt on 8 emotions (e.g., happy, sad, anger), each using 9
point Likert scales. The facial expressions were all gener-
ated using FaceGen, with standardized gender, race, and
other features, and varying only in emotional expressions.
Previously [29], we used a probabilistic graphical modelling
approach to show that participants’ judgments of emo-
tions given multiple cues—what we term emotional cue
integration—can be modeled as the joint Bayesian inference
of P(emotion|outcome, face), using the individual likelihoods
P(emotion|outcome) and P(face|emotion).
In this paper, we use probabilistic programming to re-
model this dataset. The purpose of this re-modeling is ped-
agogical. We use a real dataset (rather than a simulated, toy
dataset) of managable size and with actual hypotheses. Our
aim is not to outperform our prior analysis, but to provide
readable, illustrative examples for high-level takeaways.
However, we show later that the probabilistic programming
re-modeling offers more capabilities than our prior analysis,
such as the ability to generate novel faces.
Fig. 3. Excerpt of Pyro code that learns a linear regression mapping
appraisals to emotion ratings, with graphical representation on the right.
We use plate notation: There are N independent observations of out-
comes and emotion ratings, and the parameters β are constant and
shared across the observations. The compute_appraisal() function
takes in a representation of an outcome and returns an appraisal (l. 3).
We then sample regression coefficients βi for each dimension i from
a Normal distribution, given parameters µi, σi (l. 4). We compute the
estimated emotion rating (l. 5), and then condition on having observed
the emotion rating in the data (l. 6), in order to infer the values of µi, σi.
4.2 Modeling Appraisal
First, let us consider the “causes” of emotion—the appraisal
process. Appraisal can be represented by a function that
takes in a representation of the event and performs some
computation to yield emotions. The model could also define
an intermediate representational space of appraisal dimen-
sions, such as goal-conduciveness, novelty, and controllability
(e.g., [15], [17]), map events onto those dimensions, and sub-
sequently map from the appraisal dimensions to emotions.
Following our previous work [29], we consider a simple
linear model (Fig. 3). People observe an agent experiencing
the outcome of a gamble, and provide emotion ratings of
how that character is feeling. We assume that to do so,
observers compute an appraisal of the outcome via a linear
function of the features of the gamble. We can, based on the-
ory, identify a set of features of the gamble that may factor
into such an appraisal, such as the amount won relative to
the expected value of the gamble. Let us abstract out that
computation into a compute_appraisal() function that
returns a set of appraisal variables. Hence, we have a model
that learns a linear mapping from these appraisal features
to the emotion—really, a linear regression.
This linear model provides a simple starting point
that already contains many rich features. We ab-
stracted away the appraisal calculation into a separate
compute_appraisal() function, which we can modify
without impacting the logic of the generative model. Here,
we modeled the mapping from appraisal variables to emo-
tion ratings using a linear regression; we could substitute
that with a non-linear function, like a feed-forward neural
network that we fit to the data. This choice of fitting and
learning is conceptually distinct from the choice about ap-
praisal dimensions.
Another way of modeling uncertainty, as taken in
Bayesian regression, is to model the prior distributions over
the model parameters. This is useful in modeling individual
or group differences in appraisal. For example, people rea-
son very differently about the emotions of someone close to
them than a stranger, and we showed that we could capture
this via differences in model parameters [46]. In Bayesian
regression, one can hypothesize that there are several popu-
lations of people, each with their own distribution of model
parameters—perhaps males tend to reason differently from
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Fig. 4. Excerpt of Pyro code that implements a semi-supervised variant of a variational autoencoder, with graphical representation on the right. The
latent variable z captures aspects of the face (e.g., shape) that are emotion-irrelevant, while θ parameterizes the distribution Pθ(face|emotion, z).
Here, θ are weights in a neural network within the Decoder() function (l. 7). This code builds off Fig. 3 by generating an emotion conditioned on
the observed outcome and emotion ratings (l. 3-4), sampling z from its priors (l. 5), and generating a face conditioned on the observed data (l. 6-8).
females. One posits prior distributions over parameters,
then sample regression models from those distributions,
conditioned on the data. From the data, one can infer the
population distribution of model parameters, which could
provide insight into group or individual differences in emo-
tion reasoning (We have an example in our repository).
Representing appraisal as a probabilistic program allows
many exciting extensions. For example, the appraisal func-
tion can take as input an estimate of the agent’s beliefs and
desires. Depending on the model specification, one could
first infer beliefs and desires, and then pass them into an
appraisal function to reason about latent emotions [57],
or one could jointly infer beliefs, desires and appraisals
conditioned on the data [39]. We can also define richer
representations for emotions, and richer computation on
these representations. In the example above, the return
value of the compute_appraisal() function is a real-
valued vector (or tensor) representing emotion intensity:
Such a function could instead return an emotion “object”
that contains attributes like the target of the emotion. To
achieve this, we would have to define a space of possible
targets (which could be constrained to the specific context)
so that we can sample from this space during inference,
and we would have to embed the target information within
the appraisal representation. Although implementing this
would still require effort, it seems to us that probabilistic
programming offers the most plausible route to success
among existing approaches.
4.3 Learning Emotion Recognition from Faces
Next, we consider how to easily integrate learning from
high-dimensional data. For most affective computing appli-
cations, we are interested in the mapping from emotions
to observable behavior like facial expressions. While there
are theories mapping emotions to facial expression (e.g.,
the Emotion-Facial Action Coding System or EM-FACS;
modified from [81]), they may not be exhaustive, and im-
plementation brings its own set of engineering challenges
[82]. Most researchers prefer to learn the mapping from high-
dimensional facial expression images to emotions, rather
than hand-specifying this transformation.
We can extend the code above to specify a generative
model from emotions to facial expressions, Pθ(face|emotion),
and to learn the parameters θ of such a model from data.
For example, we can use a convolutional neural network
to model Pθ(face|emotion, z), where z is a latent vector that
captures aspects of the face that are not determined by
the emotion (e.g., face shape, gender). The parameters θ
can be learnt via stochastic variational inference (SVI) [83].
Modern probabilistic programming languages are able to
perform SVI automatically with a small amount of input
from the modeler. SVI historically required the derivation
of a quantity called the evidence lower bound (ELBO)—
the ELBO is maximized during training, much like how a
loss function is minimized during many machine learning
approaches. In practice, the ELBO contains the posterior dis-
tribution (e.g. P(z|face)), which is often intractable, but can
be approximated with variational distributions (in our case,
q(z|face)) that can also be parameterized by neural networks.
Trained in this manner, the model is a semi-supervised
variant of the variational autoencoder (VAE) [84], a popular
generative model that has received significant attention in
the deep learning community.
Building this model in Pyro is relatively straightforward
(Fig. 4), and again highlights how the complexities of infer-
ence and optimization are orthogonal to model specification.
In the model, using a logic similar to Fig. 3, we sample the
z’s from some priors (that could also be learnt). We then
specify a Decoder() function as a neural network that
takes the z’s and emotions and generates a corresponding
face. Within PyTorch, a fairly complicated neural network
can be specified in a few lines of code (see our repository).
This model can be further improved by letting the model
learn the latent emotion space. Thus far, we have treated
emotion as an observable variable, as we operationalized
emotions using ratings that people provided, either after an
agent experienced an outcome, or after an agent shows an
emotional facial expression. This is usually standard prac-
tice in many supervised learning paradigms (see reviews of
[7]), where we train a model to predict an observed y given
variables x and provide the model with fully-observed pairs
of (x,y). However, in operationalizing emotion as a set of
Likert scale ratings (as we have done), or a categorical label
(as many classification tasks do), we limit the model to
learn only the emotions that we, the modelers, chose, and
only in the manner we specify. Concretely, some emotion
theories have argued that there is a latent affect space that
characterizes affective phenomena, and that most of the
variance in emotion ratings or emotion concepts can be
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Fig. 5. Excerpt of Pyro code that implements a multimodal variational autoencoder. For simplicitly, we removed the plate notation and omit the
variational parameters (θ) that parameterize the distributions.
captured by a low-dimensional representation, such as two-
dimensional space containing Valence and Arousal [85], or
three dimensions or Valence, Arousal, and Dominance [86].
To build this model, we adapt the structure of a recently-
proposed Multimodal Variational Autoencoder [87]. In this
variant of the VAE (Fig. 5), we posit a latent affect space.
Outcomes, via appraisal, give rise to changes in the agent’s
affect, which in turn give rise to the agent’s facial expres-
sions. When participants report on the agent’s affect by
providing emotion ratings, they are mapping their estimate
of the agent’s affect onto lay emotion concepts via some
mapping P(rating | affect). Note that the rating space has
dimensions of discrete emotions like happiness, sadness (i.e.,
the dimensions of the Likert scales that we asked partici-
pants to report), but the affect space is one that we allow the
model to learn from the data. The model might also learn
latent features about the faces, outcomes, or ratings that are
unrelated to emotions, such as gender, face shape, much like
the latent variable z that we added into the model in Fig. 4.
The multimodal VAE model provides some flexibility in
performing inference. Because of the causal dependencies
in the graphical model (Fig. 5, right), each of the modalities
are mutually independent given the latent affect. Thus, the
model can deal effectively with any subset of the modalities.
Specifically, it can do inference over emotion ratings given
examples with only facial expressions, only outcomes, or
examples with both facial expressions and outcomes.This
is a big advantage over many existing multimodal emotion
recognition systems that cannot flexibly deal with incom-
plete data (i.e., observations with missing modalities).
4.4 Using probabilistic programs as generative models
All the models discussed here are generative models that
allow us to sample new examples from the model: Indeed,
sampling and conditioning is part of the inference process.
In particular, if we consider the multimodal VAE model
from Fig. 5, we can randomly sample a value of affect in the
latent space (i.e., we can sample from the prior, often a Gaus-
sian sphere), and generate the outcomes, faces, and emotion
ratings that are associated with that value of “affect”. We
can also perform conditional sampling: we can condition
the model on a particular set of emotion ratings (e.g. high on
happiness, high on surprise), and have the model generate
the outcomes and faces that are most likely associated with
those ratings. In Fig. 6, we show some conditional samples
Fig. 6. Samples from a multimodal VAE. Top: sampled faces conditional
on very low and high reward outcomes. Bottom: sampled faces and
gamble outcomes, conditioned on emotion ratings. The black triangle
on each wheel indicates the outcome of that gamble.
from the model. Given that we only showed it a small set
of faces, the model is able to reproduce the faces fairly well,
and in fact can generate new faces that correspond to a novel
outcome or an uncommon set of ratings.
In these examples, we have avoided discussing inference
in these models for a number of reasons. First, we chose to
focus on motivating the model specification from emotion
theory. Second, Pyro—and PyTorch—abstracts away the op-
timization and inference algorithms from the affective com-
puting modeler using high-level functions. Indeed, there
exist powerful routines like stochastic variational inference
[83] that solve or approximately solve the types of problems
that arise in affective computing. Third, we show that the
modeler can leverage state-of-the-art research done in artifi-
cial intelligence and deep learning, such as easily adapting
the semi-supervised and multimodal [87] variants of the
variational autoencoder [84]. This can be done without
necessarily getting bogged down by the details of how and
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why they work. For readers interested in the details of the
implementation, we provide more details about inference,
and links to literature and tutorials, in our code repository.
5 GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this paper, we propose that probabilistic programming
offers a principled and theory-driven, yet flexible and com-
putationally efficient manner of specifying affective comput-
ing models. We draw inspiration from recent lay theories
of mind and lay theories of emotion implemented using
probabilistic graphical approaches, as well as two recent
examples of non-affective models implemented in proba-
bilistic programming, to propose a basic framework for
modeling emotions using probabilistic programs. We pro-
vided illustrative code, written for conceptual clarity rather
than predictive performance, about how one might model
appraisal (reasoning about emotions from outcomes that
occurred), emotion recognition from images, and inference
about emotion from multiple channels.
We hope that, by providing open-source code in a mod-
ern probabilistic programming language, we lower the bar-
rier to entry for two groups of researchers. The first includes
emotion theorists who want a standardized approach to
specifying computational models of emotion, which is both
easy to learn yet flexible enough to represent complex the-
ory. For this first group, being able to leverage optimization
and deep learning libraries to learn efficiently from large
data is also an added bonus. The second group includes ma-
chine learning researchers and computer scientists familiar
with deep learning who want to build more psychologically-
grounded models, by offering a modeling paradigm that
elegantly specifies scientific theory. This will hopefully pro-
vide a bridge to synergize efforts in affective computing
from both data-driven and theory-driven approaches.
5.1 Boundaries of the approach
The probabilistic programming approach is suitable to im-
plement a wide class of models. One way to characterize
this is by borrowing David Marr’s [88] classic proposal that
researchers can understand computation (and cognition) at
three complementary “levels of analyses”. The highest-level,
the “computational level”, focuses on understanding the
goal of the computation: what are the inputs needed to
produce the output of a computation. For emotion recog-
nition: what are the contextual cues and behaviour needed
for inferring someone’s emotions? Probabilistic approaches,
as they focus on building causal models of the world, are
well-suited to models at this level of analysis: Indeed, all of
the models discussed in this paper are framed at this level.
By contrast, probabilistic approaches tend to be more
agnostic about Marr’s second, “algorithmic” level of anal-
ysis. Models at this level are concerned with the process of
transforming the inputs of the computation into the output.
Questions at this level include: how do people scan facial
expressions for emotional information—eyes, then mouth?
How fast do people make these judgments? How long do
emotion episodes last? At the present moment, most prob-
abilistic approaches, including probabilistic programming,
do not make strong commitments to process-level mod-
els, or resultant behaviour like eye-tracking and reaction
times. It remains to be seen whether future probabilistic ap-
proaches can make stronger claims at this level of analysis.
This is in contrast with, for example, cognitive and emotion
architectures [16], [19], [22], which usually take a strong
theoretical stance on the dynamics of emotion processes,
such as defining fixed-interval cognitive processing cycles
and similar constraints on emotional dynamics. (To finish
the discussion, probabilistic approaches have even less to
say about Marr’s third, “implementation” level, which is
concerned with how computation is implemented in the
brain or other physical systems. No one of these “levels”
is superior to the others: They answer different questions,
and are all complementary to understanding computation.)
5.2 Connection to other approaches
In Sections 2 and 3, we discussed how the probabilistic pro-
gramming approach naturally implements intuitive theories
(or probabilistic graphical approaches). It is also compatible
with many non-probabilistic models. For example, Ortony,
Clore and Collins’ [17] model of appraisal (logical rules)
can be easily modified and implemented in a probabilistic
program. Probabilistic programs can also implement dimen-
sional [85], [86] or other [66] representations of emotions and
affect, and be used to compare competing theories.
As mentioned in Section 5.1, probabilistic programming
approaches focus on a different “level of analysis” as
process-level models and architectures that describe emo-
tion dynamics [16], [19], [22]. Indeed, we think that in the
future, models built using the probabilistic programming
approach will have to interface with architectural models
when it comes down to defining dynamics. This should
be possible given the modularity of both architectures and
probabilistic programming. This might also allow us to
model more task-general aspects of cognition and emotion
using probabilistic programming in the future.
Probabilistic programming can also leverage deep neural
network architectures. For example, Figs. 4 and 5 illustrate
variants of a deep generative model. The compositionality of
probabilistic programming allows different “components”
of the model to be represented using deep networks [4], [5],
[6], [7], but embedded within a larger theoretical model.
5.3 Future Potential
Probabilistic programming may help offer integration across
the field of affective computing. Having a common mod-
eling paradigm—and ideally, a common programming
language—makes it easy to scientifically test competing
theories. Because theories are represented as modular pro-
grams, one can easily substitute different theories (via sub-
stituting different chunks of code) within the same frame-
work. For example, one can test different formulations of
appraisal, or different representations, within this common
framework. Many researchers [12], [21] have repeatedly
echoed the need for a common platform to synergize re-
search efforts across the field. While previous cognitive
architectures like SOAR had seemed to promise such a
common platform on which to build and test cognitive and
emotion theories, the (lack of) uptake of these architectures
outside the groups that developed them—relative to the
uptake of machine learning and deep learning approaches
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to emotion—suggests that there may be numerous barriers
to adoption for other scientists. Perhaps the solution lies
in having accessible software packages written in popular
languages supported by a vibrant development community.
Probabilistic programming may also inform greater in-
sights into human psychology. If we train a probabilistic
program to model how people recognize emotions from
facial expressions, we can learn not only what facial features
people tend to use in emotion judgments, but also people’s
relative weighting of those features, which may vary by
context or individual differences. But beyond learning peo-
ple’s “model parameters”, probabilistic programming also
allows us to refine theories. For example, researchers can
specify an appraisal theory as the model’s prior “knowl-
edge”. The model can update these appraisal mappings to
match empirical data, or to learn new appraisals (e.g., using
tools from Bayesian non-parametrics). Researchers can then
query the programs to further refine their theory. This is
especially necessary today when there is too much data for
researchers to specify everything necessary for modelling:
We need models that can not only implement psychological
theory, but also learn to add to and refine existing theories.
As probabilistic programs are generative models, they
hold promise for applications that require emotion gener-
ation, such as in virtual characters [65]. We showed sim-
ple code that could learn to generate an emotional face
conditioned on receiving a particular outcome. Obviously,
this model needs a lot more data to generate realistic emo-
tional expressions, but it could already generate emotion-
appropriate faces without a programmer telling it what a
smile is. This approach of learning parameters of a genera-
tive model from rater data can augment existing emotion-
generation models that rely on hand-tuned expressions.
We can take the idea of emotion generation one step
further, to model goal-directed emotion generation. Earlier in
the paper, we discussed the Rational Speech Act framework
[70] whereby effective communication can be modeled as
nested probabilistic programs. This offers a natural exten-
sion to model communicative theories of emotion. Emotions
serve a communicative role [56], [89], and people often
have goals to convey their emotions to others, for example
expressing appropriate negative emotion to an employee
who produced sub-par work, or strategically choosing emo-
tions to display in a negotiation [90]. We can apply this
principle to cases where an affective computing agent has
to solve the goal of correctly communicating an emotion to
a human user. The agent (e.g., a virtual character) builds a
model U of how the user would infer the agent’s emotions
given the agent’s emotion displays. The agent can then nest
that model U into its own decision-making model. Based
upon the agent’s inferences of the user’s inference of the
agent’s emotions, the agent can then choose its behavior to
maximize the probability that the user arrives at the correct
conclusion. Thus, by leveraging the compositional nature
of probabilistic programs, we can embed communicative
theories and goals as nested models of agents reasoning
about human users reasoning about agents.
Further extensions may also allow the modelling of
complex phenomena like behavioural regulation and decep-
tion. For example, people learn to regulate their emotions
depending on the social context. An individual insulted at a
party may not immediately act upon their anger (to confront
their aggressor), and may instead choose to suppress their
anger, going against the action tendencies of their current
emotional state. They might even go further and fake a smile
or a laugh—behaviour contrary to their current emotional
state. Current models cannot handle such complex cases,
but the combination of probabilistic programming models
of emotion understanding discussed here with decision-
making models (e.g., POMDPs) may offer a solution. This
necessitates several nested layers of reasoning made pos-
sible by compositionality: The affective computing agent
reasons about how the individual feels in context, but that
individual may in turn be thinking about others in their
social context and their inferences about said individual.
In summary, affective computing research has made
much headway over the past two decades, buoyed by the
emergence of many theory-based computational models of
emotion, as well as many data-driven machine learning
approaches. There remains, however, much room for inte-
gration across many of these research groups and research
approaches. It is our hope that the probabilistic program-
ming paradigm, by combining the strengths of both theory-
driven and data-driven approaches, may be a candidate
for standardizing and unifying efforts in computational
modelling of emotion and other affective phenomena.
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